Foreign observers have long praised the high quality of Japanese elementary and secondary education. However, for an equally long span of time, Japanese higher education has been looked upon as the weakest link in the system. It is noteworthy that not only foreign experts, but also most of the Japanese populace itself seems to agree. Japanese universities are frequently derided as mere ‘leisure lands,’ in which students enjoy their free time without heavy academic requirements or workloads.

Recently, however, the Japanese government, with the full support of the business community, has launched bold policies aimed at reforming university education, citing the pressures generated by global competition. The ambitious goal is to enhance the quality of the system by ‘internationalizing’ Japanese universities.

Two of the most influential recent policies are the ‘Global 30’ and ‘Super-Global University’ projects. These two policies exemplify the pros and cons of an increasing push to use English as a medium of instruction in Japanese universities.

By analyzing both these policies, and in particular the ‘Super-global University’ project, we can understand the deeper logic at work and begin to locate problems that are already embedded therein.

Discourse analysis of project policy documents reveals government anxiety about Japanese universities’ positions in the World University Rankings—so-called ‘league tables’ such as Times Higher Education (THE) or QS. The Japanese government has set an ambitious target to increase the number of Japanese universities in the top 100 places in the World University Rankings from the existing two institutions to 10 over just the next 10 years.

Policymakers have suggested that one primary weakness of Japanese universities (i.e., the source of lower scores) is in the ‘international outlook’ component of the world rankings composite indicator. For example, the University of Tokyo was ranked 23rd in the 2014/15 THE evaluation exercise with 32.4 points in the international outlook index. In comparison, Oxford University was ranked 3rd with an international outlook score of 90.7, and the National University of Singapore was ranked 25th overall with a leading 94.9 points. For Japanese universities to move up the rankings, policymakers believe that it is critical to improve the international outlook scores. For this reason, the ‘Global 30’ project was launched in 2009, with the aim of inviting 300,000 international students to Japan. Although the project originally planned to fund 30 universities, budget constraints limited the number of institutions chosen by the Ministry to 13.

The ‘Super Global University’ project started five years later in 2014 as a funding scheme that aimed to enhance the international compatibility and competitiveness of higher education in Japan. Thirty-seven universities were selected and are expected to use the project’s funds to take the lead in comprehensive internationalization and overall university reform. The detailed application forms for the ‘Super Global University’ project submitted by those institutions include numerical data on their goals. Analyses of these data provide...
insights into the ambitions and potential problems inherent in these plans.

In the application forms for the ‘Super Global University’ project, institutions were required to report their latest (2013) and future (i.e. planned for 2023) statistics for the percentage of classes taught in foreign languages (in most cases in English), both at the undergraduate and post-graduate levels. Figure 1 shows the distribution of this percentage of undergraduate courses among the 37 universities selected as members of the ‘Super Global University’ project. As shown, many institutions plan to nearly triple the proportion of classes taught in foreign languages over the next ten years (the projected average of 23% in 2023 is 2.9 times higher than the average of 8% in 2013). Similarly for post-graduate studies (Figure 2), many universities plan to nearly double the share of classes taught in foreign languages from 2013 to 2023 (the projected average of 44% in 2023 is 1.9 times greater than the average of 23% in 2013). These figures show that in order to improve their international outlook scores, many ‘Super Global’ universities have set extremely ambitious goals to ‘internationalize’ their course offerings.

To achieve these goals, each of the university blueprints also shows an expansion in the number of staff that can teach classes in foreign languages. However, looking closely at the details of the plans that have been submitted, we find some dubious schemes to enable this deep transformation. Specifically, in their application forms, each institution was asked to report the latest (2013) and future (i.e. planned in 2023) number (and ratio) of teaching staff who are ‘foreign and such’ (gaikokujin kyōin nado). Figure 3 shows the case of University X (a pseudonym), a local national university located in the southern part of Japan, as an illustrative example. Figure 3 indicates that there are currently 348 full-time teaching staff members classified as ‘foreign and such,’ which accounted for 33.4% of the total university full-time teaching staff in 2013. This ratio looks surprisingly high, but we find that it derives from a problematic calculation of this group of full-time teaching staff members. Guidelines attached in the Ministry application form indicate that within the general category of ‘foreign and such’ there are sub-categories for Japanese nationals who have gained overseas experience in one of three ways: (i) those who obtained an academic degree (Bachelor’s, Master’s, or Doctoral), (ii) those who spent time doing research and/or teaching in institutions in foreign countries for more than one year but less than three years, and (iii) those with more than three years of experience in...
foreign institutions. Among these three groups, the second constitutes the majority—about 61% of the total number of the ‘foreign and such’ group—although this group could have simply met the requirement through two sabbatical trips abroad. In a parallel fashion, the university plans to greatly increase the number of ‘foreign and such’ teaching staff over the next decade, but foreign national staff account for only 120 (15.6%) out of the 770 ‘foreign and such’ hires that are planned by 2023. In contrast, the number of staff with 1 to 3 years of experiences abroad will increase by 430 positions (55.8% of the total ‘foreign and such’). It is doubtful that Japanese nationals with only short-term research activities and little or no teaching experience abroad will be able to teach high quality, advanced academic classes in a foreign language.

The category of ‘foreign and such’ is apparently being interpreted in the same way at other institutions as well, as shown in Figure 4. Many institutions in the ‘Super Global University’ project plan to increase the number of full-time teaching staff classified as ‘foreign and such’ primarily through the addition of those with one to three years’ experience abroad. In the context of budget constraints and continued policy uncertainty, such tactics may enable these institutions to make a realistic-looking plan to ‘internationalize,’ while only very modestly increasing the actual number of foreign national teaching staff. However, this makes the ‘internationalization’ policy superficial, and suggests that it will be highly impractical to offer the large number of classes that the institutions have projected will be taught completely in a foreign language, whilst still maintaining quality.

Current problems in teaching and learning at Japanese universities further deepen the difficulties associated with the full development of an internationalized university environment. Currently, most classes are lecture-based and have only a few reading and writing assignments. Students normally take about 12-13 different courses in a single semester, which makes it difficult for professors to require that students undertake intensive assignments. Moreover, Japanese university education basically ends after three and a half years as students begin full-time, intensive job-hunting activities in the middle of their junior year. Employers do not factor in GPA or higher degrees when hiring, which causes a vicious circle in reproducing an environment in which there are limited incentives for university students to study seriously.

Moreover, as long as this status quo continues, Japanese nationals with only limited experience abroad will have difficulty teaching classes in English with reading and writing assignments of the same volume and complexity as universities in native-English countries. Even though they might be able to deliver lectures in English with sufficient preparation and rehearsal, Japanese university teachers will also have considerable trouble leading discussions in foreign languages that will stimulate students intellectually and raise the quality of education, particularly at the graduate level.

This brief analysis highlights the question of whether or not recent policies aimed at internationalizing Japanese universities can change the status quo. In answering that question we must also understand that only a few universities and departments truly face ‘real’ international competition. The majority of institutions and departments will compete only domestically for the foreseeable future, i.e. for jobs, funds, and Japanese-student enrolments. For these universities there is little incentive to internationalize teaching. Persistent doubts about the continuity of the policy (and especially about the sustainability of its budget) also make universities hesitant to undertake deep structural reforms. There is a high risk of non-implementation. Under these conditions, the policy reforms may succeed in making university education look superficially internationalized, but will ultimately be unable to improve the quality of education to compete in the global labour and educational markets.

The Q&A began with a question on how Japan’s efforts to wrestle with English-language hegemony compare with other countries’, and whether it actually makes sense to have an ‘internationalization’ agenda. A related question asked how much attention policymakers should be really pay to rankings such as THE that are published in English and distributed primarily throughout the Anglosphere. Prof. Kariya responded by pointing out that Japanese universities are competing not only with Western countries, but also with regional ones. As other Asian universities improve their place in the rankings, they will be more regionally competitive, and Japanese universities must respond to this pressure. The problem is that universities have to buy in and compete for the available funds against the backdrop of long-term budget cuts, even if their implementation plans are superficial and poorly developed. The number of universities that should be funded is ultimately a matter for policymakers to decide, but they should also pay attention to the question of how internationalization policies can provide incentives for serious planning to improve the quality of education and learning. Ultimately, the structure of Japanese learning has to change. With regard to which rankings may be relatively more useful or desirable, what is clear is that the government has concluded that Japanese universities’ greatest weakness is in their International Outlook—whether or not they look at other rankings. Such discourse around the ‘global’ has a lot of power to create demand for institutional change.

Next, there was a question on the relationship between demographic changes—specifically population decline—and the pressures on universities. Prof. Kariya responded that with declining domestic enrolment, Japanese universities...
will certainly need more students from abroad to survive, and some may even disappear from the market.

The next commenter pointed out that globalization not only standardizes, but also differentiates and celebrates some differentiated features. In light of this, what are the strengths of Japanese universities that should be preserved? In his answer, Prof. Kariya pointed to two key strengths. The first strength is that Japanese universities, with their huge class sizes, function as an efficient, low-cost way to distribute knowledge in Japanese. The second strength is that, compared to other non-Western countries, Japanese universities already have many readings and textbooks in Japanese. A huge accumulation of knowledge does not need to be taught in English, and that can be useful to all sorts of countries.

The next commenter asked whether there were data on the relative ‘International Outlook’ of different departments (e.g. natural science vs. social science), and whether it was really up to universities to produce internationally competitive young people. Prof. Kariya responded by pointing out that the evolution of language has on local contexts. The ascendency of English as a global language has on local contexts. The ascendency of English as a global language has on local contexts. The ascendency of English as a global language has on local contexts.

Canada’s National Framework of ‘Multiculturalism Within a Bilingual Framework’ and Possible Implications for Japan

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Language policies are an important mechanism for organizing national identity, unity, and belonging across all communities within the state. In particular, language policies on bilingualism or multilingualism may provide recognition and rights for minority and Indigenous language groups. In addition, national language policies increasingly have to contend with the effects that the ascendency of English as a global language has on local contexts. The evolution of language policy in Canada has had to account for all of these complexities and provides a useful case study for the development of language policies in other national contexts, including Japan.

Although Canada spans a vast territory, its population of 35 million is concentrated along its Southern border with the United States, and since the end of World War II has seen a shift from rural to urban areas. Currently, English is the first language of approximately 24.8 million (or 75 percent) of the population and French is the first language of 7.7 million (23.2 percent). French speakers are mainly concentrated in Quebec (majority francophone), New Brunswick (currently Canada’s only officially bilingual province), and parts of Northern Ontario, with a few small francophone communities in other parts of the country. There are over 60 different Indigenous languages in Canada (grouped into 12 distinct language families), and Indigenous communities—who are about 1.4 million of the total population—can be found all over Canada, with a particular concentration in the Northern regions of the country. The demographics and geographical distributions of these and other language groups have historical antecedents that also inform the evolution of language policies in Canada.

Canada has existed as a country since 1867, but policies that have guaranteed rights—to varying degrees—for English and French speaking communities can be dated to the late 1700s. As the French and English were the first European groups to settle in significant numbers in the regions that later became Canada, official acts such as the Treaty of Paris (1763) and the Royal Proclamation (1763) provided recognition of one form or another to English, French and (to some extent) Indigenous language communities. However, it was with Confederation and the passage of the British North America Act in 1867 that some level of rights for the use of English and French in Parliament, federal courts, and education were officially instated. Although the provinces have enacted different policies over the years since Confederation—with varying levels of support for English and French use—it as not until the 1960s that anyone demanded equal rights...
for both English speakers (anglophones) and French speakers (francophones). These demands, coming mainly from francophone communities who felt that they were being left behind economically and politically, fomented separatist and independence movements in Québec (the province with the largest concentration of francophones), raising concerns about national unity. In response, the federal government established the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (RCBB) on July 19, 1963.

The RCBB was one of the longest and most expensive commissions of its era. It consulted Canadians at public hearings across the country and brought in many experts to provide research and academic insight for its final reports. The RCBB’s recommendations led to the development of Canada’s first Official Languages Act (1969), which declared Canada to be a bilingual country with English and French as the sole official languages. Although Indigenous and other cultural groups fought hard during the commission to have their languages officially recognized through a multilingualism policy, in the end the commission decided to recognize only two official languages. However, when the commission submitted the fourth volume of their final report, which recommended that Canada also be declared bicultural, Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau instead declared a policy of multiculturality (1971), stating that henceforth Canada was to be ‘multicultural within a bilingual framework.’

The legacy of the RCBB has been the enshrinement of these linguistic and cultural rights into the Canadian constitution as part of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982). A robust set of collective official language rights (sections 16-22) is now constitutionally entrenched, including the right to official language minority education (section 23); however, multicultural rights are a comparatively weak set of guarantees for individualized cultural rights, with no guarantees for non-official languages (section 27) and no specific rights accorded to Indigenous language speakers. The result is a hierarchy of language rights for different groups, with federal support going mainly to official languages and varying levels of support—if any—for all other non-official and Indigenous languages at provincial and local levels.

Since the Official Languages Act in the late 1960s, there has been an overall steady increase in census rates of official bilingualism, but these rates are not evenly distributed across the country and in fact declined slightly between 2001 (17.7 percent) and 2011 (17.5 percent). In 1977, Québec passed its own language policy, The French Language Charter, which declared French to be the sole official language of Québec, including for education, as a way to halt the ongoing language shift into English. Despite this policy, rates of English/French bilingualism have been rising steadily in Québec (from 40.8 percent in 2001 to 42.6 percent in 2011) while they have been declining in Canada overall (from 10.3 percent in 2001 to 9.7 percent in 2011). Given the highly protectionist nature of the French Language Charter in Québec, these trends are a testament to the incredible linguistic pull that English exercises in relation to other languages.

Nonetheless, the economic, cognitive, and cultural benefits of official bilingualism are widely acknowledged and have shifted attitudes in favour of bilingualism, such that 86 percent (2004) of Canadians agree that it is important for children to learn a second official language. With the adoption of the Official Languages Act, French became a mandatory subject in English medium-of-instruction public schools. There has also been a proliferation of different types of French immersion programs over the past few decades—particularly outside of Québec—in which students have French as a medium of instruction across the curriculum for part or all of the school day. In French immersion programs, the same academic content is taught as in the regular English program, and research shows that French immersion students do as well as or better than their non-immersion counterparts in tests of math and science. Although French immersion students have better French language skills in reading and listening rather than in speaking and writing, these imbalances are not serious obstacles to their use of French for academic or interpersonal purposes. Thus, overall, French immersion
appears to be an effective approach to fostering French–English bilingualism among young anglophone Canadians, yet only about 10 percent of eligible students are enrolled in French immersion programs nationwide, and only about 51 percent of French immersion students tend to continue on in French at university. One factor in this high attrition rate is the shortage of qualified French immersion teachers owing to insufficient teacher training in content areas at higher instructional levels. This means that immersion education is not sufficiently widespread at this time to substantially increase French-English bilingualism in Canada; hence the plateauing of official bilingualism outside of Québec.

On the other hand, non-official languages are gaining considerable ground in Canada, with approximately one fifth of the Canadian population reporting speaking a non-official language at home. This increase in non-official language use is a reflection of Canada’s immigration policy. Over the past few decades, Canada has accepted 250,000 immigrants per year on average—one of the highest per capita permanent immigration rates in the world. Source countries for immigration have also multiplied (more than 200 different ethnic origins were reported in the 2011 census) and have shifted from European countries to those of the Global South since the introduction of the point system for immigration in the 1960s. This shift is reflected in the relative levels of different non-official languages. As of the 2011 census, with an estimated 6,775,800 immigrants (20.6 percent of the population), Canada had the highest proportion and population growth rate of immigrants of all the G8 countries.

The federal government’s preference for a skilled labour force is reflected in the emphasis on official language proficiency and education in the immigrant points selection system. The proportion of aging workers and retirees in Canada is increasing rapidly as well, and while immigrants may help to sustain population growth and meet some of Canada’s labour needs, they have also experienced challenges in labour force participation and mobility in recent years. Within the next decade, immigration is projected to account for most of the net labour force growth; thus, given their economic significance, the successful integration of immigrants into the labour market is a priority for the federal government.

In terms of determining the particular challenges that immigrants face with regard to labour market mobility, employers and newcomers identify official language proficiency as...
one of the biggest barriers to integration. Thus, since the early 1990s, the federal government has had a national English as a second language (ESL) adult immigrant language-training program, Language Instruction for Newcomers (LINC). This program provides 900 hours of language instruction for permanent residents, from basic literacy to advanced levels of language training. More recently, the federal government has also put funding into higher-level labour market oriented official language training programs. Many provincial budgets also provide official language training for immigrants. Although these programs are popular, their efficacy, adequacy, and resource continue to be matters of concern both for the governments and for language learners.

As a result of its particular historical development, Canada now has a robust set of linguistic rights enshrined in the Official Languages Act to bolster the status, acquisition, and retention of French against the pull of English. English continues to exert a powerful language shift effect on proximate languages in Canada, as it does globally owing to its status as the pre-eminent language of the global economy. This poses a conundrum for many countries that might wish to protect their native languages without jeopardizing their international competitiveness. As a result, language policy evolves and is the subject of unending debate. This is certainly true in Japan, where discussions have included making English a second official language. Investment in English-language education is growing amid concerns that English may also be displacing other languages in Japanese schools.

Although Japan has invested in English language learning programs (such as the Japan Exchange and Teaching [JET] program) since the late 1980s and is introducing English-language learning earlier in elementary school, Canada’s investment in bilingual immersion programs can perhaps still inform the evolution of language education policies in Japan. Research on bilingual immersion programs in Canada has demonstrated that additive bilingual education has clear cognitive and academic benefits, but qualified teachers are vital for the persistence of language learning outcomes. These insights could inform the ways in which Japanese language education policies foster and maintain interest and motivation in English-language learning into senior grade levels and beyond to cultivate ‘Japanese with English abilities.’

Although Canada has clear policies on multiculturalism, the rejection of the demands for substantive multilingual rights that were made during the Royal Commission has meant that multiculturalism in Canada has been diluted to a set of mainly performative cultural rights for non-official language groups. The Canadian example serves as a cautionary tale for thinking about the future of Japan’s Multicultural Plan (2006), particularly the nature of ‘Multicultural Co-existence’ (tabunka kyosei) and how it can evolve in a way that is not ambiguous in focus or assimilationist in its outcomes. A substantive notion of multiculturalism could provide support for different forms of bilingual education in Japanese schools that go beyond just English and Japanese, as well as inform other forms of recognition and rights for long-term ‘foreign residents.’

The Canadian government has addressed concerns about an aging labour force and long-term productivity through immigration policies that use a point system to filter for the ‘best’ immigrants. In many cases, official language training programs have been provided in an effort to optimize immigrant integration into the Canadian labour market. These policies can inform efforts to ensure that Japan’s current institution of a point system for immigration both encourages highly-skilled immigrants and avoids creating criteria are that are so onerous that the desired number of immigrants cannot be admitted. Canada’s year-long national immigrant language training program, LINC, is based on the realities of adult second-language acquisition and therefore can provide insight into the adequacy of current Japanese as a second language (JSL) training programs for foreign workers—both pre- and post-arrival in Japan—and inform the provision of JSL at local levels for long-term foreign residents. Ultimately, Canada’s extensive history and experience of developing language policies for political and economic purposes can inform how Japan addresses its economic priorities, goals for global integration, and internationalization.

Leading off the discussion, the first commenter asked whether, in seeking to foster global leaders and communicators in Japan, there has perhaps been too much focus on compulsory English-language education, putting too high a burden on many teachers. Prof. Haque responded that it is true that English is not an all-encompassing panacea, and that while it is often easy to assume that everyone in a society wants and/or needs it, that is not necessarily the case.

The next question asked how multiculturalism, bilingualism, and multi-ethnicity correlate, and to what extent Cana-
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da (a multi-racial society) and Japan (with largely Asian immigrants) are actually comparable, especially in terms of the viability of a multilingual society. Prof. Haque replied that Canadian immigrants were quite racially homogenous until the introduction of the points system. Economic necessity forced Canada to cast its immigration net more widely, and Japan may soon find itself in a similar situation. Moreover, official bilingualism is not doing as well as hoped in Canada. It is the non-official languages that are thriving. Finally, in Canada we are witnessing what often happens in a multi-racial country: a shift to the dominant language. Francophones have particularly high levels of bilingualism.

Next, a commenter asked how Canadian anti-immigrant views could be reconciled with favourable attitudes towards multiculturalism. Prof. Haque pointed out that this contradiction is also found elsewhere, and that people tend to hold contradictory views—especially along general vs. specific lines. Moreover, multiculturalism is performative, especially in defining the Canadian identity vis-à-vis the United States.

Next, Prof. Haque was asked whether there is competition for immigrants between French and English speaking areas of Canada. She responded that the province of Quebec has its own language policy and is very keen to attract immigrants to bolster the francophone population. The conundrum for Quebec is the nationalist sentiment that there is an essential Quebecois identity—thus there is a challenge to articulate and preserve this sub/national identity, while simultaneously bringing in the immigrants required for linguistic and economic reasons.

The next question was about whether there are statistically-significant differences in crime rates between immigrant and non-immigrant communities in Canada. Prof. Haque replied that while Canadian crime rates have been falling for years, violent crime remains proportionately higher in small town and rural areas. People sometimes have the impression that we are living in dangerous times, and this can focus attention on particular neighbourhoods; however, when you look at what activities are being construed as crimes (e.g. white collar vs. petty drug use) and which communities are being targeted for enforcement, reported crime rates begin to look misleading.

Another commenter asked about immersion. What are the overall costs and benefits? Could content classes such as art be taught in English? Prof. Haque replied that the benefits are huge. In Canada, ambitious and well-resourced parents send their children to immersion because it gives them the best education they can get. Content classes can absolutely be taught in English; the question is to what extent the state will invest in teacher training. If you want good educational outcomes, you have to focus not just on the student, but also on ongoing teacher training and retention.

The next question asked whether multiculturalism is likely to gradually decline, or perhaps come to be protected only in principle. Prof. Haque responded by pointing out that the ‘decline of multiculturalism’ has been talked about since its inception. In some ways, ‘multiculturalism’ functions as an empty signifier for all sorts of societal goods or ills. When you create something with little substance, it allows for people to project what they need into it. In terms of moving away from multiculturalism in Canada, it really depends on what you are talking about, in what context, and to whom. Multiculturalism certainly persists as a badge of ‘Canadian-ness.’

The next commenter asked about parallels between the Canadian and American experiences in integrating immigrants. Prof. Haque noted that while Canada and the United States no longer have explicit racial preferences in their immigration policies, there are subtle ways in which both countries encourage certain groups and discourage others and make it easier for some rather than others to integrate. Examples include laws, language requirements, and even official documents such as citizenship guides that signal that certain cultural practices are welcome while others are not. These are all elements of a regulatory regime that shapes the immigrant experience and determines the diversity of a society. This regime is not necessarily intentionally discriminatory, but it can be discriminatory in its effects. Increasingly stringent official language requirements for family-reunification candidates provide an example. Many family-reunification candidates are elderly and unlikely to work in a capacity that requires official-language competency, yet their inability to meet a language bar may mean not only that they cannot immigrate, but also that their higher-skilled relatives will not, affecting social diversity as a whole.

Next there was a brief question on whether Canadian public broadcasting involves conscious efforts to embrace official languages and bilingualism. Prof. Haque responded that there are indeed official language requirements for public broadcasters (the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, or CBC, and its French-language equivalent, Radio-Canada). While there are no requirements for non-official languages, obviously institutions do have to contend with and engage with non-official language audiences. Thus, for example, courts have multilingual interpreters, and hospitals put out multilingual communications.

A final question asked whether Quebec’s notion of ‘interculturalism’ (as opposed to multiculturalism) reflects unique homogenizing tendencies. Prof. Haque said that it did, noting that Quebec has chosen a different path from the rest of Canada in this regard. Much like France, Quebec identifies itself as a secular society (albeit one with a strong Catholic heritage), which generates assimilationist pressures stronger than those associated with Canada’s multicultural mosaic.
Reexamining Japan in Global Context

English as a Lingua Franca

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