Civil-Military Relations
Reexamining Japan in Global Context Forum, Osaka, Japan, August 10, 2016

U.S. Civil-Military Relations: The Myth of ‘Objective Control’
Matthew Moten
(Formerly) United States Military Academy, West Point

*Presidents and Their Generals* was written to explain why people should be knowledgeable about the roles and responsibilities of civilian and military leaders. These relationships have changed over time, and those changes have affected the way we make war and peace.

When the American Revolution began, a dearth of national precedents complicated the new country’s existential challenges. George Washington established the principle of civilian control of the military by consistently subordinating himself to the Continental Congress. After the war, a new constitution codified roles for the executive and the legislature, but those powers placed the two branches in conflict and made the military uncomfortably subordinate to both. Under Andrew Jackson, the presidency gained energy and authority at the expense of Congress. Abraham Lincoln had almost no military or executive experience, but he quickly became a commander-in-chief who fully grasped the need to think of his generals as instruments of his policy; with General Ulysses Grant he forged one of the most effective political-military collaborations in American history. In the decades following the American Civil War, the military shrank yet again to a relatively modest force, but it would mushroom to gargantuan proportions in wartime. By World War I the professional military was accepted as a normal part of American government, so much so that Woodrow Wilson all but delegated the running of the war to General John J. Pershing. In World War II, Franklin Delano Roosevelt conceived the role of commander-in-chief far more expansively than Wilson, yet General George Marshall and the Joint...
Chiefs of Staff learned to work with him and they became a very effective team.

The latter parts of the Civil War and World War II proved the high points in effective political-military relations, largely because presidents and their generals managed to work through early setbacks to attain mutual trust. Over this period the military profession became almost entirely nonpartisan. After World War II, the presidency and the military both began to increase their governmental power, largely at the expense of Congress. Concurrently, national security and defense issues took center stage in peacetime American life to a degree that they had previously done only during war.

During the Cold War, the need to maintain a nuclear arsenal and ready surface forces led to rapid growth of the U.S. military establishment and defense budgets. The hero generals and admirals of World War II found themselves near the apex of the Washington power structure. Powerful service bureaucracies and their political allies competed to gain larger shares of growing defense outlays.

These newly powerful services also put greater emphasis on carefully grooming officers to take on institutional values. Over time, the military establishment bureaucratized professional military education to produce senior leaders of uniform excellence. Yet Douglas MacArthur’s insubordination to Harry Truman during the Korean War put future presidents on notice that generals warrant close scrutiny. President Eisenhower and his successors chafed at a succession of company men, each of whom seemed focused on the protection of his own branch of service. Presidents came to mistrust the professional assembly line because they could not control it.

The major conflicts of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries were wars of choice. Commanders-in-chief began attempting to select generals or admirals who would provide public support. In Vietnam, Desert Storm, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the principal military leaders—Generals Taylor, Powell, Franks, and Petraeus—responded by allying themselves politically with the presidents who handpicked them. This resulted in amicable relations, but poorly developed policy and badly executed strategy. Moreover, successive presidents, doubting the disinterestedness of the previous administration’s military counsel, were left with the necessity of finding like-minded generals of their own.

To the extent that political-military tensions fostered informed decision making, they can be productive. Frequently, however, both policy and strategy have suffered. Some causes of the stress are structural, codified in the Constitution and in legislation. Yet the tensions have become more profound and less constructive over the past six decades.

Managing these difficulties should be a high priority, but participants on both sides of the relationship are handicapped by their own cultures. Civilian policy makers are often unfamiliar with the military, its mentality, and its methods; they may be politically astute but militarily naïve. Similarly, senior military officers have limited familiarity with the political arena—they are militarily expert but politically naive.

Writing in the first decade of the Cold War, Samuel Huntington posited an ideal model of political-military relations that he called ‘objective civilian control,’ which divorced the military from political life in exchange for maintaining its professional autonomy. Seen as an abstract concept, objective civilian control has much to recommend it. Ideally, in peacetime, professional soldiers would remain unequivocally subordinate to their political masters, who would, in turn, develop clear, unambiguous policy goals. Upon the outbreak of war, soldiers would then prosecute the conflict to its successful conclusion unfettered by political interference. Upon the achievement of peace, civilians would resume their supremacy.

Huntington contrasts his ideal of objective civilian control with an unhealthy condition he calls subjective civilian control, in which civilian groups compete to maximize their access to and power over the military, generally at the expense of other civilian groups. Huntington argues that subjective control decreases military security in the state because it compromises military professionalism. Thus, subjective control is the worst possible outcome for national security. Yet in practice, no wall stands between political and military matters. Political and military leaders engage in continuous dialogue. Soldiers sometimes stray into the realm of policy making, while civilian leaders involve themselves in professional military matters.

The monopoly of civilian control by political interests comports with both human reality and the U.S. Constitution. Huntington’s model neglects the complexity fostered by the fact that the U.S. Constitution divides civilian control of the military between the president and Congress. The framers intended for the two branches to check one another.

The essential flaw in Huntington’s theoretical wall is that it divorces the responsibilities for national security policy and strategy. This demands too little of military professionals and of their civilian superiors, both of whom can and should maintain a shared, but not equivalent, responsibility for sound policy and effective strategy. The Constitution makes both officers and civilian officials accountable to the people to provide for the common defense. Contrary to Huntington’s assertions about objective control, admitting that both sides shoulder parts of this responsibility does no violence to military professionalism.

Soldiers and politicians alike should understand that both parties will regularly cross the fine boundary between their respective duties. As Clausewitz put it, ‘At the highest level the art of war turns into policy. . . . The assertion that a major military development, or the plan for one, should be a matter for purely military opinion is unacceptable and can be damaging. Nor indeed is it sensible to summon soldiers, as
many governments do when they are planning a war, and ask them for purely military advice.’ Like Huntington, Clausewitz described a theoretical abstraction, ‘absolute war,’ as a means of measuring and describing ‘real war,’ as it happens in an imperfect world. Clausewitz’s fundamental theoretical insight, that ‘war is merely the continuation of policy by other means,’ is meant to show the political limitations on war. It also pithily describes why objective civilian control of the military is impossible to achieve.

Objective control is preferable, but unattainable. Perfect subjective control can lead to military tyranny. The solution in a healthy democracy lies somewhere in the negotiation between them.

The president is captain of the ship of state, whether he is an expert sailor or a nautical novice. He may choose to delegate navigation, propulsion, steering, even the defense of the ship, but he cannot delegate responsibility for the ship itself. Neither can his lieutenants presume to make important decisions for the captain, such as the ship’s mission and its ultimate destination. An astute captain will appreciate advice and act on it. But he may decide to trust his own judgment, for this is his prerogative.

It is incumbent upon the officers of the ship to earn the captain’s trust through expert and ethical practice. Similarly, each military adviser must earn each president’s trust, and that of his advisers and the Congress. Civilian leaders and military commanders should deal with each other in good faith. But their interaction should not mask the duty of civilian leaders to prescribe where the boundaries in their relationship will lie.

Generals and admirals have to trust in the American electoral process; they must respect the legitimacy and competency of political leadership to govern and to craft effective policy. To do so, in the words of their commissioning oath, is ‘to support and defend the Constitution.’ Generals are obligated to support that policy so long as the orders they receive are legal and moral.

The most successful wartime presidents learn to trust their generals and admirals. History shows that the military services often do not provide the right flag officer at the beginning of a war; however, presidents can rest assured that the right officer will come along. Presidents need to heed their instincts, as Lincoln learned to do, and to think of their generals as potentially useful but certainly replaceable instruments. The best officer for one situation or set of goals may be completely unsuited for another.

Presidents should value an effective political–military relationship so highly that they are prepared to be ruthless to achieve one. They should replace generals without remorse when the reciprocal give-and-take seems to be breaking down. Likewise, a military adviser ought to be ready to step aside if he discerns that he is not the best adviser at that time for his president.

In the least effective relationships—Lincoln-McClellan and Truman-MacArthur—a lack of trust clearly hampered both policy and strategy. In the most effective relationships—Lincoln-Grant and Roosevelt-Marshall—the generals gradually earned trust with proven ability and demonstrated trustworthiness, and U.S. forces followed those political and military leaders to victory.

What can the American people do to improve political-military relations? What should we expect of our commander-in-chief? Experience in uniform is not necessary. Our best wartime presidents, Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt, had a grand total of one month of military service between them. However, we can and should expect them to possess and to explain a clear worldview, a sense of what our national security entails and of what general strategies they will pursue to safeguard the nation’s interests. It is helpful for presidents to have an appreciation for the capabilities of the professional military and its nonpartisan ethos. It has long been understood that the president should appreciate American values as they relate to the prosecution of war, including those embodied in international law. Most importantly, the people can and should hold our political leaders accountable for their policies and decisions.

What can the military profession do to improve political-military relations? They can attempt to promote an understanding that strategy and policy are interwoven and that participants on each side may stray into the other’s realm. However, practitioners on both sides should stray only as far as their own competence will allow, and most importantly, as far as they are willing to accept responsibility.

The American people should expect their military leaders to display exceptional competence at all levels of war from the tactical to the strategic. Flag officers—unlike civilian leaders—have no right to be wrong in their professional judgments, especially when expressed as advice to their civilian superiors. Furthermore, military leaders must be wholly dedicated to national interests, even at the expense of Department of Defense or service interests. They must give presidents and their advisers candid, confidential advice and never carry discussions of national security matters outside of executive councils.

Moreover, our political leaders and the American public have a right to expect that the professional military will be completely nonpartisan. This protects the profession and enhances trust. Service to country does not entail the loss of citizenship, but equating professionalism with any ideology or party is dangerous, both to the military and to society, as the history of any number of totalitarian regimes and failed states will attest. Most civilians respect the professional military, partly because of its nonpartisanship, and professionals must protect and nurture that standing.

Finally, we should view the military profession as an integral part of society. There is an unfortunate tendency on the
part of some in the military and some who presume to speak for it to set the profession above and apart from American civilian society as morally superior. Such professional arrogance is illogical because such polemics tend to impute to the military profession values that it does not profess for itself, and dangerous because military-cultural elitism can undermine the fundamental definition of a professional soldier as a servant of society. As Sir John Hackett noted, contra Huntington: “What a society gets in its armed forces is exactly what it asks for, no more and no less. What it asks for tends to be a reflection of what it is. When a country looks at its fighting forces it is looking in a mirror; if the mirror is a true one the face that it sees there will be its own.”

Following the presentation, the first commenter asked what presidents can do in peacetime to ensure that they have the best possible relationship with the military. Further, how can they tell whether they have done this well? Dr. Moten responded that political candidates should undertake a serious and long study of what the military is, its history, and what its strengths, flaws, and roles are. Minimally, they should have advisors who understand this. It is worth emphasizing that presidents do not have to get along with their generals. In fact, it is probably good to have some tension. Moreover, if generals become too politically amenable to their presidents, this is not good either. If Maxwell Taylor, for example, had pushed back against Kennedy on Vietnam rather than seeing his role as to be a ‘true believer,’ we might not have been pulled into that tragedy.

A follow-up question asked whether Lincoln could have known in advance that he should have turned earlier to someone like Grant? Dr. Moten responded that the answer is no: human relationships are extremely important, and history does not necessarily put the best president or the best general in place at the right time.

The next commenter asked why there have been no coup attempts in the United States, unlike in other countries. Can we attribute this to the Constitution, to training, to institutional culture, to some other factor? Dr. Moten responded that George Washington became the personal embodiment of professionalism as commander of the Continental Army; his behavior was almost impossible to fault because he so regularly subordinated himself to the Continental Congress. In subsequent years, he was such a mythic figure for the nation and the military that every military figure wanted to emulate him. It is hard to overstate the influence of Washington’s example. Another answer to the question is to challenge its premise; the civil war in a sense was an attempted coup.

Another commenter asked about public criticism of President Obama by high-ranking security officials, and in particular the resignation of three of his defense secretaries. Are they likely to have been representing the views of the profession more broadly? Dr. Moten responded that this was generally not the case. Defense Secretaries tend to have their own bureaucratic fiefdom that is more important than whatever ties they may have to the military, which vary in any case from secretary to secretary. All of the secretaries in question chafed against Obama’s tendency to centralize decision making in the White House, but this is only to some degree idiosyncratic of the Obama administration; there is a broader trend of growing centralization of decision making and greater power in the presidency. The commenter then asked about a possible Trump presidency: if he threatened to withdraw troops from Korea or other regional countries, how should generals react? Dr. Moten responded that there is a normative and a descriptive answer. What they should do is agree to execute his policy, so long as Mr. Trump could miraculously overturn the statutes currently keeping the U.S. in those places. Descriptively, however, the generals would quietly begin working their contacts in Congress to make sure that such legislation would never pass. As a final follow-up, the commenter then asked what would happen if Mr. Trump were to find like-minded generals first, and then try to make a move to withdraw troops. Dr. Moten responded that this might be more plausible, but that Mr. Trump’s views are so extreme that it would be a challenge to find sufficiently like-minded individuals within the military establishment.

The next commenter asked whether there have been any noticeable trends in political-military relations under Republican administrations compared to Democratic ones. Dr. Moten responded by pointing out that there has been a long-cherished belief in American politics going back to the Vietnam war that Republican administrations are better at handling national security than Democratic ones. However, this has more to do with the incumbents and the advisors that they have than with party affiliation. Moreover, this belief is changing, largely in response to the mistakes made by the second Bush administration in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The next commenter stated that there seems to be a need to socialize both the military and civilian community to achieve the positive outcomes Dr. Moten describes, in particular with regard to the mutual enmeshment of military and political spheres. How can we do this? What does the military need to know, and what do civilians need to know? Dr. Moten responded that it is much easier to socialize the military through military education, especially for the officers—for example on the military’s responsibilities under the Constitution. To a degree, this is already successfully institutionalized. The real challenge is to educate political leaders. Hillary Clinton, for example, has had a superb informal education in how the military works and how the political-military relationship can and should work. Mr. Trump, on the other hand, has virtually no education on this front, and there is little that anyone can do about that. As for what ci-
vilians need to know, that is the question that *Presidents and their Generals* tries to answer.

The next commenter asked about the influence of the defense industry on political-military relations. How does including the industry in the analysis affect our understanding? Dr. Moten acknowledged that this is an omission in his argument—one that would have taken his writing in a different direction. We should never underestimate the subtle and pervasive power of the defense industry in national security issues. When Eisenhower was drafting his famous farewell address, he initially planned to refer to dangers posed by the ‘Military-Industrial-Congressional Complex,’ rather than simply the ‘Military-Industrial-Complex.’ His advisors convinced him not to use this term, but it is telling that he had planned to. Every year, Congress will over-fund appropriations, including for equipment that the military not only did not ask for, but does not want, simply because of the power of defense industries lobbying Congress and the Pentagon. It does not help that high-ranking military officers retire with a pension and frequently go to work in the defense industry. We ought to have a moratorium—perhaps as much as five years—on senior officials doing so. They are not hired for their expertise, but for their contact list; this contact list should expire before they join the defense industry. Unfortunately, that is not going to happen.

The next commenter suggested that to be subordinate to both the executive and the legislature seems contrary to the constitutional stipulation that the military should be subordinate to the executive alone. In what ways, then is the military actually subordinate to Congress, given that the president is commander-in-chief? Dr. Moten responded by pointing out that Congress constitutionally writes laws governing the military. Congress also has the power of the purse, and could theoretically cut off funding and thereby end a military engagement (although this is an unrealistic scenario). Congress also has the power to declare war, which they have not exercised since 1942. Finally, perhaps most significantly, is the ‘advise and consent’ clause in the Constitution. The legislature confirms senior officers, holding them to the promise of giving their unvarnished professional opinion if they are ever called to testify, even if it does not comport with the priorities of the executive.

The next question was about Dr. Moten’s personal experience with Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki, for whom Dr. Moten worked as a speechwriter and legislative advisor. General Shinseki fell out of favor with the second Bush administration, particularly Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, over contrasting views of the strategic requirements of the invasion of Iraq, especially after General Shinseki testified to the Senate that the occupation would require many more troops than the administration had estimated. His estimates were soon proven to be accurate, but the administration is widely seen to have forced him into early retirement for not towing the line. What can this episode tell us about political-military relationships? Dr. Moten responded that while he was too close to the events to make any historian comfortable, he has previously written about what General Shinseki did and should have done, and has described him very favorably.

The next question asked about the American Civil War. Did the generals who went over to the Confederacy have a legal obligation to serve the Union? Dr. Moten responded that they did, since they had all sworn an oath to the United States Constitution.

Another commenter asked about the president’s power to choose officers. How much power does the president really have? Dr. Moten responded that the president has most understanding of the 30 or 40 four-star or budding four-star officers that he has dossiers on, so his power is limited to the extent that he does not normally look beyond this number. But the president and the secretary of defense come to know them very well and can see how they have performed. There was a time, for example, when Donald Rumsfeld was interviewing every general for every three and four-star position, which was seen to be reaching too far. The problem is that presidents tend to look for generals who will be publicly supportive of their policies. This was true of President Kennedy and General Taylor, of George H.W. Bush and General Powell, and of George W. Bush and Generals Franks and Petraeus: in each case a general was selected who was going to carry out a policy-strategy goal and was named for that purpose. This creates a lack of tension between the president and the general that is not healthy.

Another commenter asked about Dr. Moten’s emphasis on the division of labor between presidents and generals. Is this essentially an exercise in creating a subtler set of walls between these two parties than Huntington did? Dr. Moten responded that knowing that there is a possibility for both sides to cross the boundary—and not knowing when that is going to happen—it is important to understand, following Clausewitz’s observation that war is ‘a continuation of politics by other means,’ that there is no such thing as ‘purely military advice.’ Thus political leaders should not ask for ‘purely military advice.’ But it is also important for generals to sit down during the quiet luxury of peacetime and reflect on the nature of the advice that they give and might be called on to give, and determine what their own personal redlines might be as a general.

Another question asked about how the president’s ability to fire officers is different from similar decisions elsewhere. Relatedly, what makes the military distinct in this regard? Dr. Moten responded that the president can fire officers but cannot unilaterally hire them; he (or she) can only nominate them. The military is distinct due to the historical precedent of having developed as a public sector profession over the last 200 years or so, and because the officer corps has come to see the
A lot of recent attention has been paid recently to the Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF). Twenty years ago, it would have been hard to believe that the SDF would be deployed to Iraq. What accounts for these changes?

Relatedly, recent public opinion polls on the SDF have been tremendously positive. If people think so highly of the SDF, why are they so uneasy about recent changes such as the Legislation for Peace & Security?

Another relevant question is whether civilian control is ‘secure’ in Japan. A little more than half of Japanese respondents suggest that it is; but why do the rest disagree? If Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution—the so-called peace clause—were abolished, what would make people feel secure in its place?

More broadly, what recent changes in the political institutions and policy making process have led to changes in civil-military relations in Japan? This is not a question that is asked very often. In answer to these questions, the bottom line is that there will be a shift from a containment type of civilian control to engagement, but engagement is more difficult to manage than containment. Thinking about ‘the guardianship dilemma’ and drawing on survey data on SDF officers, societal elites, and the public at large can help to shed light on trends in Japanese civil-military relations.¹

The guardianship dilemma is one of the underlying themes of civilian control: there is a need to balance protection by and protection from the military. Weakening the military—in response to distrust, for example—can decrease security from external threats. Conversely, strengthening the military in response to external threats can diminish civilian control. Samuel Huntington’s solution to the guardianship dilemma was objective civilian control. The problem with Huntington’s argument is that it is somewhat tautological: any military intervention becomes evidence of non-professionalism. Additionally, his argument and analysis do not necessarily ‘travel’: they were grounded explicitly in the U.S. system of checks and balances. Approaching the guardianship dilemma in a different context thus requires wrestling with a different set of institutional dynamics.

In contrast to Huntington’s model, the American sociologist Morris Janowitz argued that a clear division of labor between civilians and the military is neither realistic nor effective, owing both to advanced military technology and to non-traditional missions. Instead, Janowitz suggested the model of the citizen-soldier, wherein the military should be as reflective of society as possible, making it easier for a democracy to have a military without being threatened by it. But the problem with Janowitz’s argument is that it also has a degree of tautology. Is the makeup of the military really all that matters?

We thus have to go beyond Huntington and Janowitz and look to the recent civil-military relations literature, which tries to bring in perspectives from elsewhere in political science and sociology. This leads us to two literatures. The first deals primarily with institutions and the ways in which dif-

¹ The survey in question was conducted with Hitoshi Kawano and funded by the MEXT/JSPS Kakenhi (Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research) program.
ferences in political institutions affect how civilians control the military. The second deals primarily with preferences. There is an assumption that the civilians and the military must have different preferences. But is this correct?

With regard to institutions, it has been argued that civilian control can be thought of as a ‘chain of delegation’ that is somewhat different in presidential and parliamentary systems. Presidential systems have a two-tier chain of delegation where voters get to choose both the president and the Congress. In parliamentary systems, voters choose the parliament and the strongest party chooses the prime minister who chooses the cabinet. When the executive is part of the legislature, it is easier to have more effective communication, monitoring, and sanctioning because there is not the same type of balancing as exists between a legislature and a presidency. However, over the long term, military personnel tend to be attentive to civilian preferences since there is a more unitary civilian actor, and there is a greater risk of civilian mistakes and excesses than in a presidential system.

In presidential systems, in the short term civilians may give conflicting instructions to the military, and the military can play the presidency and the legislature against each other. In the long term, however, a presidential system tends to produce a strong military organization with specialized expertise, because the system of checks and balances ensures a certain degree of military autonomy.

Although Japan is a parliamentary system, in the past the legislature was not particularly decisive. There was little incentive for legislators to focus on defense because it did not win them votes. Japan’s electoral system incentivized returning patronage to local districts. Politicians also responded to a perceived anti-militarism among their constituents. In addition, the prime minister tended to have a very weak base, including in the cabinet, since cabinet members were not necessarily chosen by the prime minister with an eye toward pursuing his particular objectives. Additionally, the civilian in charge of the SDF was not expected to play a key political role in controlling it, so there was a tendency to choose people with little expertise. Finally, there was a general perception that civilian control was not a political task, but a bureaucratic one, with the media serving an oversight role. In this context, there was greater concern with protection from the military rather than protection by the military, and the perceived need for military containment was pursued through extensive use of ‘ex-ante’ controls. Politicians set up trip wires of control that set the boundaries of what the SDF were expected to do. And the biggest of these was the Constitution itself.

Given the perceived importance of the constitution, the bureaucrats, and the media, elected politicians never really thought that they were in charge of civilian control. There is an enduring perception that if not for these constraints, the SDF would have expanded in a manner that might have threatened democracy. The question becomes whether all these ties and constraints were actually containing the SDF, or whether this ‘containment’ approach primarily tied politicians’ hands, by restricting the ways in which they could use the SDF, rather than restricting what the SDF could independently do.

Consider the budget, for example. The fact that the military had a budgetary ceiling meant that there was not much attention paid to what was purchased within the spending limit. Similarly, with regard to personnel, there was little attention paid to who was in the SDF, in part because of ambivalence about conscription. Accordingly, no one paid much attention to how reflective the military was of the broader society.

With respect to the use of force, the SDF determined very early on that the only way to manage the defense of the country was through the U.S.-Japan alliance, so there was very little push toward autonomy. In that sense, Japan has never had a SDF that wanted to do something different from what the civilian leadership wanted. Paradoxically, therefore, anti-militarism and politicians’ avoidance of military matters led to extensive delegation to the bureaucracy, an emphasis on ex-ante control, and institutional control that was very self-binding for politicians. In the short term, this came at the cost of taking proactive steps on military policy; in the
long term it led to a loss of expertise and a loss of leverage vis-à-vis SDF bureaucrats. The fact that politicians thought they had built a system of controls, combined with disinterest, actually gave the SDF a great deal of autonomy within the constraints.

With the end of the Cold War and the revisiting of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the SDF’s role within the alliance became an issue. This led to greater scrutiny and expectations of a more proactive role. The ties that bind the politicians became an issue for the politicians themselves.

Around the same time, a chain of delegation emerged that more closely resembled the Westminster type. Electoral incentives also emerged for politicians to pay more attention to security issues. There is now a lot more centralized party leadership, given that there is now only one candidate who can run for each district. In terms of the cabinet, there is less attention to the proportionality of different party factions, and more focus on what the prime minister wants to achieve. The minister of defense is now seen as an important figure who acts on behalf of the prime minister to achieve his goals. In short, there is much more political leadership vis-à-vis the ministry than before. Politicians find that their hands are both less tied and stronger.

Overall, civilian control through containment is diminishing, and civilian control by engagement is increasing. The question now is whether there is potential for divergent preferences between the SDF and civilians that we need to be concerned about. When the SDF was understood to be contained, their preferences were not that important. If they are going to be less contained, their preferences become more important to the political-military relationship, and to civilian perceptions of it.

Survey data can help to shed light on all this.

The SDF is not necessarily meant to be reflective of society. When asked in 2014 if they have any friends in the SDF, about 60 percent of general public survey respondents reported that they do not have friends in the SDF. There has been a slight increase in the number of SDF officers reporting that they have non-SDF friends, so there may be slightly more familiarity and integration with the broader society than before. When asked whether they would support a close relative joining the SDF, survey respondents showed more support than popular wisdom might expect.

Another interesting result is that when looking at the perceived risk of war, there has been a decrease in the number of people among the general public who see some danger, whereas it has been pretty much flat for both civilian elites and the SDF.

Survey results also suggest that the intensity of support for the U.S.-Japan alliance may be much higher among the SDF and the civilian elite than among the general public. Survey results are similar with regard to support for a more active role for peacekeeping operations.

Regarding whether there should be an increase or drawdown in defense spending, survey results show a slight increase in support among the civilian elite between 2004 and 2014; a large increase among the SDF; and a very small increase among the general public. Generally, people prefer the status quo.

There is a higher propensity for civilians to think that the SDF should stand up to political leadership than there is among the SDF themselves. When asked if SDF officers would be likely to resist a difficult-to-obey or unwise order from the Ministry of Defense, for example, SDF officers themselves were more likely to say ‘never’ than were the civilian elite.

One might have expected an increase over the past decade in the SDF’s desire for greater influence, but survey results show the opposite. Some people have suggested that this is because the military feels that their views are already respected and that they already have a sufficient role in the decision-making process. Another possible explanation is that, following the Democratic Party of Japan government, the SDF is more cautious about the public’s perception.

SDF officers were also asked, ‘How many casualties do you think are inevitable in the case of different situations?’ One might imagine that in the case of emergency situations, SDF officers would expect that more than 100 casualties would be
inevitable, but 10 percent of respondents expected zero casualties. In 2004, there was no civilian answer that was less than 30 percent. This suggests that if politicians wanted to put the SDF in harm’s way—especially in a manner perceived to be inappropriate—there could be some tension in the relationship, given that there is a stronger resistance to casualties among the SDF. Overall there has not been that much change from 2004 to 2014. There is a greater gap between the general public and the SDF than between the civilian elite and the SDF, which is interesting compared to the United States, where the civilian elite tend to be a lot more liberal.

To return to the initial question: Is civilian control in Japan secure, and has it been secured?

The answer is yes, but not necessarily because it was put in a cage, which did in fact have paradoxical consequences. Civilian control worked, rather, because the SDF has tended to have the same preferences as the civilian elite.

Looking toward the future, we can expect a more decisive political system than before, and a much wider policy spectrum associated with changes in government. If war is too important to be left to the executive or the generals, what role should there be for the Diet? If the Diet is going to have a greater role, we have to think through issues around access to information, secrecy, and security clearances.

In sum, there has not been that much of a gap between civilian and military perspectives, despite limited societal interaction between the two groups. If there is something to worry about, it may be that there is such strong support for dependence on the U.S.-Japan alliance that should the political leadership deviate from this—which is hard to imagine—this could be a source of civil-military tension. Another area is casualty sensitivity. If the government tries to pursue something that the SDF perceives to be potentially dangerous, there might be resistance to that.

In short, despite popular concerns about the SDF doing something rash and risky and the government not being able to stop it, the reverse might be more likely to be the case.

Following Dr. Hikotani’s presentation, the first commenter suggested that it seems that the military is not the threat it has been made out to be. While the survey results seem to show an impressive degree of continuity in public opinion, the geopolitical situation became more problematic from 2004 to 2014, so one would expect there to be more concern. What kind of event could change the SDF or public’s tolerance level for casualties? Dr. Hikotani replied that the situation may be a bit blurrier than it first appears: casualties can occur not only through combat, but also through mechanical failure, training, etc. These scenarios may be more likely for the SDF, and this can also affect casualty tolerance. Also, given the relative lack of outcry when two Japanese diplomats were shot in Iraq, the public’s casualty-tolerance may be higher than one might expect.

The next commenter was struck by the idea that survey responses to the same questions would have looked very different 80-100 years ago. This is a testament to how much Japanese society has been transformed. In this sense, one might even say that Article 9 has become moot. Is this not a case of ‘Mission Accomplished?’ Dr. Hikotani responded that Article 9 has enduring symbolic value. There is a vocal minority that still actively demonstrates against the military, but fundamentally understands the military through the lens of the constitution. However, if Article 9 were abolished or amended, it probably would not change anything.

Next, a commenter pointed out that in the constitution, there is no provision for a ‘military’—only a special group of civilians. In what sense is there civilian control, when, constitutionally speaking, there is no military in Japan? Dr. Hikotani responded that for those who are uncomfortable with the idea of a Japanese military, it is actually helpful to think in terms of civil-military relations, rather than to deny that a military can or should exist, because this implies a relationship in which the voting public exercises civilian control over the military through elected officials. It also makes it easier to think about commonalities and opportunities for learning from other countries that have civil-military relations.

The next commenter observed that it is interesting to think
about where and why recruitment occurs when thinking about casualty tolerance. SDF members are predominantly high school graduates, not university graduates, and predominantly from rural areas in the vicinity of bases. Generally speaking, they choose a military profession in order to gain jobs in the vicinity of their hometown. Accordingly, they do not have a strong incentive to go abroad. It is similar to policing in this sense: there is a degree of inward-lookingness, and many recruits are not necessarily interested in joining risky peacekeeping missions. However, neither do they want to be discriminated against or told that they cannot do so. Dr. Hikotani added that the surveys suggest that one of the reasons for low casualty tolerance is simply that while SDF officers may themselves be willing to give their lives, they do not want to lose people under their command.

The same commenter also pointed out that many defense ministers come from rural constituencies. How does regional representation affect military officers’ preferences with regard to the U.S.-Japan alliance? Dr. Hikotani responded that it is true that people who become defense ministers tend to come from electorally safe rural districts. As for the U.S.-Japan alliance, about 10 percent of the SDF consistently want autonomous defense. It is not clear where this 10 percent comes from geographically, but it is true that SDF personnel in rural areas tend to have conservative friends to whom they feel they should cater, including those who are anti-U.S. In Tokyo, in contrast, the SDF is more careful about maintaining a distance.

The next question continued on the topic of SDF composition. Are there too many recruits with family members who also serve or have served? Dr. Hikotani responded that she is not aware of how many military children are those of officers vs. enlisted personnel. There has always been a consistent number of students at the Defense Academy whose parents or grandparents were in the military. What has been increasing is the percentage of students whose parents went to the academy themselves. This is helpful for the academy, because these students are more likely to stay on and have better English skills. It is a myth, however, to think that the academy actively selects for children from military families.

The next commenter noted that while it is true that a large proportion of the general public has a positive impression of the SDF, when asked about the purpose of the SDF, many emphasize disaster relief. Gaining popular support along these lines may have a paradoxical impact on civil-military relations and the public’s expectations for the military. Dr. Hikotani responded that many of those who enrol in the academy do so because they want to do disaster relief work. As they stay in the forces they may start to see things differently. In terms of popularity, it is interesting to note that while there is no obligation to serve, students nonetheless tend to stay on. Last year approximately 10 percent of students left the academy to join the private sector. We might explain this by saying that the economy is good, but it is also true that employers have a good impression of the SDF and see them as capable.

The next commenter followed up on the public’s understanding of the SDF’s role. What are the implications for civil-military relations of the general public’s supporting the SDF when they do not necessarily have a sophisticated understanding of national security or the role of the military? Dr. Hikotani responded that it could be dangerous if the high popularity of the SDF implied public support for the officers taking charge rather than the politicians, who may be less popular. However, that is not what opinion polls show. The polls suggest that the public is happy that the SDF will come to people’s aid in the event of a disaster. The SDF is also cautious given the history of public distrust—they are not taking advantage of their current popularity to try to build support for expanded operations. They do not take the public’s support for granted.

The next contributor commented that he found the lack of general civilian awareness about the military to be appalling. One must understand the military to control it. He then asked whether the lack of an independent military justice system with military courts functions as a significant element of civilian control. Dr. Hikotani agreed that there is a lack of general awareness and knowledge of the military in Japan, but pointed out that this is not inherently exceptional relative to other countries. As for whether the lack of independent military courts enhances civilian control, Dr. Hikotani responded that she had not thought of it like that before.

Finally, Dr. Moten commented that it seems to be a great luxury for a country to need not to worry or know much about its military. In a country as expeditionary as the United States, this is perverse. One remedy might be a limited conscription to raise the proportion of the population that has intimate knowledge of the military. If a more statistically significant number of people had a reasonable chance of serving, this would make people pay a lot more attention to national security policy. Dr. Hikotani responded that this idea has been brought up in Japan as well, but that there might be other options between the extremes of poor civilian knowledge and outright conscription.
Reexamining Japan in Global Context
Civil-Military Relations

Wednesday, August 10, 2016, Suntory Foundation, Osaka, Japan

Keynote Speakers
• Dr. Matthew MOTEN, United States Military Academy (ret.)
• Dr. Takako HIKOTANI, National Defense Academy

Project Directors
• Professor Masayuki TADOKORO, Keio University
• Professor David A. WELCH, Balsillie School of International Affairs

Project Members
• Professor Ken ENDO, Hokkaido University
• Professor Takehiko KARIYA, Oxford University
• Professor Fumiaki KUBO, University of Tokyo
• Professor Yusashi WATANABE, Keio University

Participants
• Professor Kenki ADACHI, Ritsumeikan University
• Professor Naoyuki AGAWA, Doshisha University
• Professor Satoshi IKEUCHI, University of Tokyo
• Professor Naoko KUMAGAI, International University of Japan
• Professor Satoshi MACHIDORI, Kyoto University
• Professor Tosh MINOHARA, Kobe University
• Professor Yosuke SUNAHARA, Kobe University
• Professor Hideshi TOKUCHI, Sophia University

Suntory Foundation
• Mr. Wataru IMAI, Executive Director
• Ms. Miyuki MAEBA, Secretary General
• Ms. Noriko YAMAUCHI, Program Officer
• Mr. Takashi KUDO, Program Officer
• Dr. Hirofumi KUROKAWA, Torii Fellow, Osaka University

Project Assistants
• Mr. Aladdin DIAKUN, University of Toronto
• Dr. Amiko NOBORI, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
Reexamining Japan in Global Context

Dr. Takako Hikotani is currently Gerald L. Curtis Visiting Associate Professor of Modern Japanese Politics and Foreign Policy, Columbia University, and Associate Professor in Department of Public Policy at the National Defense Academy in Yokosuka, Japan. She has written many policy papers and articles including ‘Japan’s Changing Civil-Military Relations: From Containment to Engagement?’ and ‘Japan’s Extrovert Leaders: How Institutions Change Incentives and Capabilities.’ Recently, she was named Abe Fellow at the Social Science Research Council for her research in ‘Civil-Military Relations of Multilateral Military Operations.’

Dr. Matthew Moten, author of Presidents and Their Generals, was Professor and head of the Department of History at the United States Military Academy. He retired from the U.S. Army in 2014 after thirty-two years of service. An Iraq war veteran, Dr. Moten holds a doctorate in History from Rice University and specializes in American political-military relations. He is also editor of Between War and Peace: How America Ends Its Wars (Free Press, January 2011) and author of The Delafield Commission and the American Military Profession (Texas A&M Press, 2000). Other publications include ’Out of Order: Strengthening the Political-Military Relationship,’ Foreign Affairs Vol. 89, No. 5, (September-October 2010); ’A Broken Dialogue: Rumsfeld, Shinseki, and Civil-Military Tension,’ in American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009); and The Army Officer’s Professional Ethic: Past, Present and Future (Strategic Studies Institute, February 2010). A resident of Austin, Texas, he divides his time between writing and ranching.