Vol.084 Special Feature: Challenges in Science Studies
Articles

Hopes and Reality of the New Democracy in Myanmar

Marie Lall
Professor of Education and South Asian Studies at University College London

On February 1st 2016 the 390 newly elected National League for Democracy (NLD) MPs took their seats in Myanmar's two houses of Parliament in Nay Pyi Taw. 25 years after she won the 1990 elections and after many trials and tribulations, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's party was to be handed power. This historical event was the culmination of a political process that had started with the 2015 elections three months back and came as a result of almost a decade of reforms1.

1See Lall, M. (2016) Understanding Reform in Myanmar, People and Society in the wake of Military Rule (London, Hurst)

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The polls
On Sunday 8th November 2015 Myanmar had gone to the polls. More than 90 parties had contested seats for the two houses of parliament as well as the 14 state and regional assemblies. Despite the large number of parties, all eyes were on the opposition NLD and the regime USDP. In order to control the government the NLD needed 67% of the seats (or 329 seats). The NLD did much better than that and won by a landslide. Myanmar has a ‘first past the post’ system, which means that the number of seats do not represent the percentage of the vote. However the NLD still received 57% of the vote, compared to 28% who voted for the USDP. The win was uncontested and absolute and a surprise to many Myanmar watchers who had not expected such a high number of seats going to the NLD.

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Prior to the elections many locals as well as the international media abroad had worried about ‘free and fair’, but there don't seem to have been any major infringements despite repeated issues with voter lists in the preceding weeks. International observers deployed across the country confirmed that the voting had been ‘free’; although the fact that the 2008 Constitution reserves 25% of the seats for the military means that the process could not be labelled ‘fair’. NLD candidates had suffered intimidation in the run up to the elections, and the NLD had filed over 100 complaints over violations of election rules. However, given the margin of the win, there was little point in complaining about the process.

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In the run up to the elections the USDP had campaigned hard on the development agenda. It was after all due to their efforts and the leadership of President U Thein Sein that the country had been transformed. The result of the vote created intense disappointment across USDP ranks. Acting USDP chair U HtayOo had lost his seat as had his predecessor, popular parliamentary speaker U Shwe Mann, who in a previous incarnation before the reforms had been the junta's third most powerful general. Many of those who felt they had served the country and made change possible had to concede defeat. This included the President's peace envoy U Aung Min who almost singlehandedly delivered an unprecedented peace process with the Ethnic Armed Groups (EAGs) and laid the foundations for the NCA that was signed by 8 EAGs on the 15th of October this year. Those who did win seats for the USDP generally had stood in constituencies dominated by the military.

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In the ethnic states many parties and candidates had also suffered massive defeats with ethnic parties having taken high losses apart from in Rakhine State and some Shan State areas. Even in war torn Kachin State where the NLD did not at first seem that popular, the NLD was able to win most seats, including more than half of the State legislative assembly seats. In part the result reflected the lack of unity among ethnic parties, with too many parties seeking to represent one set of ethnic stakeholders. In 2010 there had been fewer ethnic parties to choose from; and of course in 2010 the NLD had refused to take part. But the main reason why ethnic voters shunned their own parties lies in the fact that ethnic citizens did not believe that these would be able to transform the overall system, and therefore threw themselves behind the NLD, despite the fact that the NLD does not have a significant ethnic agenda. The results have meant that only in the Rakhine State ethnic parties hold a majority of seats in the state parliament.

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It is clear with hindsight that the vote was one for change across the board. The NLD had campaigned on a change agenda and was therefore the obvious choice. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi had asked the electorate not to focus on the NLD candidates - but rather on the party. Given her national popularity, this approach mean that the NLD was able to defeat even locally known and popular candidates from other parties. It is also important to understand that the electorate saw the USDP still in light of its military roots. The achievements of the U Thein Sein government did not expunge the military from its role over the previous 50 years. Many voted for the NLD, but many also voted against the USDP.

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In the interim
After the elections Daw Aung San Suu Kyi met with President U Thein Sein, Commander in Chief Min Aung Hlaing and even with retired Senior General (and former dictator) Than Shwe to discuss the transition. Well-connected personalities have hinted that she met with all the senior leaders not as the head of the victorious party, but to ask for their support and advice. General Than Shwe is supposed to have endorsed Daw Suu as a leader, fuelling more speculation about her position and how the administration will deal with the hierarchy and command structure when the new government starts its term. In all her negotiations Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has been able to rely on the support of former parliamentary speaker Thura U Shwe Mann, with whom she has developed a close working relationship over her three years in opposition.

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In the three months interim transition period between November 2015 and end of January 2016 the old government retained power and convened parliament to conclude some legislation that had been left unfinished. Part of this was a controversial bill that grants former presidents immunity from prosecution for undefined acts committed while they held office. The USDP led parliaments closed their work on the 31st of January with a party that even included karaoke. The next morning the NLD MPs started work.

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The new government takes shape
Since entering parliament the NLD has put in place the two speakers and two deputy speakers for the Upper and Lower Houses of Parliament. Speaker for the Lower house is Win Myint, a staunch NLD politician. His deputy is TuKhunMyat, an ethnic Kachin and from the USDP. Choosing an ethnic nationality MP as deputy speaker of the lower house of course shows commitment to the ethnic voters. However he also has a reputation of having been involved in the drug world in Shan State, making this quite a controversial appointment that has fuelled lots of criticism already. Some speculate that it was his close connection to former Speaker of the House U Shwe Mann that got him this position. In the Upper House – also called the House of Nationalities, U Mahn Win Khaing Than, an ethnic Karen from the NLD will be chairman and U Aye Thar Aung from the Arakan National Party will be his deputy. Shortly after this the leaders of the state and regional assemblies were chosen, prompting further criticism that most were old and male, reflecting the traditional Myanmar hierarchy. Only in Mon state is the leader of the state assembly female. Two state assemblies have non-NLD chairs – Rakhine and Shan states. In the Rakhine assembly the Arakan National Party is the largest party and have nominated San KyawHla and Phoe Min as speaker and deputy speaker respectively; in Shan state the USDP nominated Sai Lone Hsai and Sao Aung Myat from their ranks. It is rumoured that these appointments had to be argued about with the NLD who wanted to control all State and Region parliaments. More arguments are expected when the chief ministers of the States and Regions will be appointed – but since this is the job of the President, the country ahs to wait.

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The next step would be for the NLD to propose two presidential candidates – one from the lower house and one from the upper house, whilst the military MPs will propose the third candidate. The vote will mean that one of the NLD candidates will become President and the other two will become Vice Presidents. The date for the selection of the President has been set for 17th of March 2016, much later than in 2011 when U Thein Sein was made president within the first week of February. Many speculate that this delay is due to on-going discussions about who will hold the top job. Rumours abound about a possible deal that might have been done with the military that could involve the suspension of article 59f, the main obstacle to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi becoming a president, due to her British sons. A change in the constitution requires more than 75% of the votes in Parliament, and therefore the assent of the military. Some voices have been arguing that suspending an article would be quicker and easier. Others point to the resulting legal controversies, as the constitution would no longer be seen as a secure document, which is why it is unclear if the military will agree to such a move. Despite the fact that none of these discussions are reported on in the public domain and everything remains at the rumour level, debates on the legality of such a suspension has dominated the Myanmar press and everyone is speculating. In any case, no matter what is decided with regard to the top post, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's has already declared that she would be ‘above the president’ and would take all the decisions. Nothing is clear at present. All that is known is that the NLD has promised to rule very differently from the previous government.

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In order to fulfil that promise Daw Aung San Suu Kyi started the change process with her own MPs. During the campaign candidates were not allowed to speak about themselves – the election was about the NLD as a party and her as a leader. It looks like the party will continue to be ruled tightly and centrally during this term. At a meeting in Yangon in December she laid down the law for her successful candidates. Their salaries will be cut so as to support the party's finance. All have had to take exams on the constitution and the party's manifesto. Those who did well and who have good English skills have been promised the opportunity to travel and get further exposure. MPs were also told that they have to pick up the rubbish in the streets of their constituencies to lead by example. In the glare of the media Daw Aung San Suu Kyi herself started by picking up trash in her constituency Kwamu. The parliamentarians elect have to declare their assets and regular checks will be made to control corruption. It has been made clear that cliques in the party will not be tolerated and MPs have been encouraged to report on each other if they feel colleagues are not good team players. Party policy will superseded personal ideas and ambitions. Whilst all these new rules certainly offer the opportunity for clean and possibly even transparent governance, some have been grumbling that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has to be careful not to replace one dictatorship with another.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi – Myanmar's future leader

Across the world, in Asia as in the West, many have expressed their support for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to become president. She is widely seen as an icon who suffered under the repressive military regime and who came out of her 18 odd years of house arrest without bitterness or resentment. Many feel she has earned the right to be president due to her history of peaceful resistance to Myanmar's military regime. Unquestionably she is also Myanmar's most popular leader, as the election results clearly showed.However given the international adulation, a reality check is in order. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has shown her true colours as a politician since her release end of 2010 and her re-entry into politics after the 2012 bi-elections.

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Possibly the most important dent in her charisma comes from an error of omission rather than one of commission. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi chose to remain silent rather than support those suffering violence at the hands of others. This is the case both on the issue of anti Muslim/ anti Rohingya riots between 2012 and 2014 as well as the continued war waged by the Tatmadaw against the Kachin Independence Army and the Kachin civilians since 2011. Whilst the world would have expected her to side with the oppressed, she tends to avoid the issue. In the case of the Chinese operated Letpadaung copper mine, where protesters were badly injured by the authorities and she chaired the investigation commission, Daw Suu sided with Wanbao, the Chinese company.

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Obsession with power and getting the presidency means she has used her charisma to focus the debate on constitutional change, rather than focusing on the real needs for economic and social reform of the country. Her focus on getting close supporters into key positions means she is even willing to ignore the democratic process of NLD members choosing those who will stand as candidates in their constituency, rather imposing someone who has a history as a political prisoner, in her view an essential qualification to be an NLD MP.

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Lastly Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is unable or unwilling to recognise what others have done to move the country forward. Not once after her release did she acknowledge the civil society organisations who did so much to kick start the reforms whilst she was under house arrest. At her Nobel Prize speech she said that in terms of progress the country had only achieved 1%. Given the scale of her election win, she now has the opportunity to make a visible and meaningful difference to her country. This will however not be without challenges.

Challenges for the new government

The role of the military
The first challenge will be to develop cordial relations with the military. Myanmar has mainland Southeast Asia's largest standing army. The constitution guarantees their place in parliament and control over key ministries including Home Affairs, Border Affairs as well as Defence. They will remain significant stakeholders in the political system and the current chief of staff General Min Aung Hlaing has clearly said that he does not believe Myanmar is ready for a parliament without military MPs. The NLD's commitment to alter the constitution and in particular change article 436, which gives the military a veto on legislation, is likely to bring the party into conflict with the military leadership. A divided parliament on military-civilian lines won't be good for national reconciliation nor the peace process, where the military is a key player. The NLD will have to find a way to cooperate with the chief of staff as well as the military MPs. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi of course has at times referred to her military heritage that she holds as General Aung San's daughter. Playing this card however will only go so far, as she and her party clearly stand for a Parliament without military MPs.

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Delivering change
The second big challenge will be ruling and administering the country. The NLD is seen as the ‘saviour’ of the country. It will be a challenge to fulfil the national and international expectations. Between 2012 and 2015 during the last parliament the 43 NLD MPs did not do much and the party did not campaign on clear policy lines. With the exception of wanting to change the constitution, the NLD has not made its priorities clear to its electorate. It is unclear how the NLD will finance its reforms. The international donor community has promised funds to support change in Myanmar, and much support was already given to the previous government. Aid and donor agencies now worry that the NLD will go back on some of the progress made, in order to shape the changes, or simply because they do not agree with what has been done. It also remains to be seen in how far the MPs that will be nominated as ministers will have the capacity to bring the changes about that their supporters are awaiting. The new ministers might actually have to rely on the old bureaucracy and it would be counter productive to try and change everyone in the administration since the NLD has no experience in running the country. The old bureaucracy for its part might make change more difficult. One expectation is that the number of ministries will be cut to allow for a more efficient administration. Otherwise rumours of changes to key ministries and their staff abound including the NLD's priority area of education. Some international donors are worried about the policies that are being proposed to them in closed-door conversations that include closing key institutions. However nothing can be verified, as Daw Aung San Suu Kyi seems to be sticking with the Myanmar tradition that does not allow for transparent policy making. Since the elections no one has any idea what is going on at a policy level, who will have what responsibilities and to what end. This is the case both for the international donor community as well as the bureaucracy in NPT.

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The previous government has also left a host of issues unfinished, for example legislation with regard to land and investment. As a part of the governance and delivering change challenge, the NLD will face the issue of the rapidly increasing gap between rich and poor. One unresolved conundrum is what to do with the farmers whose land is being ‘bought’ (or confiscated) to allow for industrial and urban development, both of which are necessary if Myanmar is going to develop. Since the NLD stands both for change and for the protection of the poor, it will be hard to strike the correct balance.

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Repairing religious divisions
The biggest challenge will probably be the one uniting the country. Myanmar's ethnic and religious diversity will not make this an easy task. An ultra nationalist Buddhist movement – called Ma Ba Tha (Society for the protection of race and religion) led by monks has gained traction in the last three years and has been fuelling anti Muslim feelings across the country. This lead to widespread anti Muslim riots, not only in Rakhine state but also across the country. Ma Ba Tha's influence resulted in the four race and religion protection laws being passed last year – which clearly discriminate against Muslims. Their perceived influence over the electorate resulted in Muslim electoral candidates not being able to contest their seats. Not one of the 1051 NLD candidates was a Muslim so that the party would not be labelled ‘foreigner friendly’. Even worse, the USDP did not allow a couple of their sitting Muslim MPs to stand again for their seats, questioning their citizenship. Despite a reasonably large Muslim population, it looks like Myanmar's 2016 parliament does not have a single Muslim MP. The NLD has not spoken up for the disenfranchised Rohingya either, despite the dire humanitarian situation in the IDP camps. The country is clearly divided on religious lines and community cohesion is going to be a difficult goal to achieve.

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Ethnic conflict and the peace process
Another issue includes the representation of ethnic people. Around 38% of Myanmar's population are ethnic minorities and there are a large number of ethnic parties. In 2010 the ethnic MPs formed the first legal opposition to the USDP dominated parliament. Despite local ethnic leaders' misgivings the NLD fielded candidates in all ethnic majority areas. Consequently many locals feared the vote would be split leading to an end of vibrant ethnic politics that had been an unforeseen result of the 2010 elections. Their fears came true as the NLD displaced the ethnic parties in their own states. This does not bode well for an inclusive political process, as even ethnic NLD candidates will put party policy first and are less likely to fight for the local ethnic problems of the constituents they represent. The NLD has always maintained that democracy is their first priority and ethnic grievances can be addressed later, a position that can be explained by their Bamar dominated ranks. A sizable ethnic representation would have been essential so as to represent the ethnic civilian voice and a parliament dominated by Bamar voices will not be good for trust and peace in the long term.

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Linked to the representation of ethnic voices is of course Myanmar's protracted and on going peace process with the ethnic armed groups. Myanmar has been fighting civil wars against several ethnic armed groups since independence. In the 1990s most ethnic groups apart from the Karen National Union (KNU) agreed armed ceasefires with the Tatmadaw. However no political process ever followed. The U Thein Sein government worked hard over three years to renew the ceasefires with all groups and even agreed an unprecedented ceasefire with the KNU. Fighting continues in the north of the country, as the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) took up arms again in 2011. Nevertheless, despite the frequent clashes, the KIA was still part of the negotiation process that led to an agreed draft ceasefire text. In October 2015 eight Ethnic Armed Groups came to NPT and signed an unprecedented nationwide ceasefire agreement. This was the first step in a process that has already led to a political dialogue framework. Those who declined to sign did so because they were unhappy at the Tatmadaw's exclusion of three groups in the process. What had been key was that the teams on both sides, including many of the non-signatory groups had learnt to trust each other. The army had been a part of the process.
At present the stakeholders are unclear how the process will continue with those who signed and what will happen with those who did not.Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has promised that the peace process will go on, and has promised to lead it, but has given no indication if she is willing to accept the political framework that was set up before the NLD took up office. At the time of writing it is also unclear what till happen to the EU and Japan supported Myanmar Peace Centre and those working there. More to the point the central question remains how the NLD led government will be able to stop the fighting between the Tatmadaw and the KIA in Kachin and northern Shan States, especially if their relationship with the army is difficult.

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Concluding thoughts
Today euphoria and popular expectation across Myanmar's electorate is high. People across the country eagerly await the announcement of who will be President, many saying that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi won, and should be given the position. Even if she does not get the top post, it is clear that Myanmar is a very different country today compared to five years ago when U Thein Sein took office. Change will continue to happen, and the country will continue to transform itself. We have to hope that in managing that change the NLD will be able to satisfy the expectations of the diverse citizens of a country that has been waiting for these results for a quarter of a century. Clearly, this will not be an easy task.

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[Postscript]
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has been appointed to a specially created role called 'state counsellor' which will allow her to operate like a prime minister. It was bitterly opposed by the military MPs. She has relinquished her posts as education and energy minister but remains foreign minister and minister of the president's office.